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In their recent Perspective, James Nicholson and John Gaffney argued for the “costs 
follow the event” (CFTE) cost-allocation approach to investment arbitration, in contrast 
to the more traditional “pay your own way” (PYOW) approach.1 They countered an 
earlier contribution by Baiju Vasani and Anastasiya Ugale,
2
 principally on the basis that a 
CFTE rule would encourage meritorious claims and discourage weak ones.   
This contribution to the debate demonstrates that: (1) there is a third approach to cost 
allocation, referred to here as the “relative success” approach; (2) “relative success” is the 
dominant approach, but is frequently misapplied in practice; and (3) there is a need for 
guidance on costs in the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID) arbitration rules. 
There is no binary distinction between the CFTE and PYOW approaches. Indeed, neither 
accurately reflects the reasoning of most ICSID tribunals. The “relative success” 
approach apportions costs based on the success of the parties on different issues in 
dispute. In a recent survey of public ICSID awards,
3
 38% of tribunals justified their 
decision by reference to the relative success of the parties on different issues in dispute 
— far more than the number following a CFTE (17%) or a PYOW approach (5%). 
Although special factors (e.g., party misconduct, unreasonable costs) may justify 
deviation, the approach adopted should correlate with the actual costs outcome: CFTE 
should normally lead to a fully adjusted costs order, while PYOW should lead to an 
unadjusted costs order. “Relative success”, conceptually linked to the CFTE approach by 
applying that approach to each issue in dispute, should lead to a partial costs order, since 
one party will typically succeed on most, but not all, key issues. The reality, however, is 
quite different. 
 2 
The survey results from the application of the CFTE approach are unremarkable. As 
expected, many tribunals adopting this approach made a fully adjusted costs order (46%), 
with a slightly smaller number awarding only some (42%) or even no costs (12%) based 
on the particular circumstances. Tribunals adopting a PYOW approach also had 
unsurprising results: an unadjusted costs order was the predominant outcome (88%), 
followed by a partial adjustment (12%). 
However, in a substantial majority (65%) of cases, tribunals using “relative success” 
made no costs adjustment; only one third (33%) made a partially adjusted costs order. 
This is counterintuitive and suggests that “relative success” is often employed as a 
shortcut to an unadjusted costs order. It is tempting to interpret this as a convenient way 
to justify preserving the status quo at the time of the award. This is supported by the fact 
that the figure is higher (83%) when relative success is the only reasoning adopted (i.e., 
without any reference to any special factors). Moreover, tribunals frequently lapse into 
“relative success” reasoning even when nominally applying the CFTE rule.4  However, 
“relative success” is a distinct approach and, as such, should lead to different costs 
outcomes from the CFTE approach in most cases.   
“Relative success” has the appeal of charting a middle course between the stark 
alternatives of the CFTE and PYOW approaches. It is open to criticism, however. Aside 
from the apparent misapplication in practice identified above, it remains a difficult, if not 
impossible, task to assign particular costs to each issue. Further, it is not obvious that it is 
fair. Should the appropriate test be whether the tribunal accepted every argument 
advanced by the successful party, or that the arguments were reasonably made? The 
CFTE rule already allows tribunals to penalize inefficient conduct, including spurious 
arguments, since only reasonable costs may be recovered.   
Costs in investment arbitration are usually substantial.
5
 The allocation of costs involves 
policy judgments, especially regarding the types of claims that should be incentivized. 
There is a stark divergence in UNCITRAL and ICSID tribunal approaches to costs.
6
 The 
absence of a default rule means that ICSID tribunals adopt conflicting decisions. Some 




 and many 
others endorse “relative success”. Some 15% offered no reasoning at all.9 The case for a 
default rule, or even guidance, for predictability and consistency is compelling. Further 
debate as to the appropriate approach should be a priority. The next revisions to the 
ICSID arbitration rules present a good opportunity to begin this process.   
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